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Mounting evidence suggests that the neural processing of emotional stimuli is prioritized.
However, whether the processing of emotional stimuli is dependent on attention remains
debatable. Several studies have investigated this issue by testing the capacity of emotional
distracters to divert processing resources from an attentional main task. The attentional
load theory postulates that the perceptual load of the main task determines the selective
processing of the distracter. Although we agree with this theory, we also suggest that
other factors could be important in determining the association between the load of the
main task and distracter processing, namely, (1) the relevance of the to-be ignored stimuli
and (2) the engagement in the main task due to motivation. We postulate that these factors
function as opposite forces to influence distracter processing. In addition, we propose
that this trade-off is modulated by individual differences. In summary, we suggest that the
relationship between emotion and attention is flexible rather than rigid and depends on
several factors. Considering this perspective may help us to understand the divergence in
the results described by several studies in this field.
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INTRODUCTION
A large number of studies has suggested that the processing of
emotion-laden stimuli is prioritized because of their relevance to
survival (Ohman et al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Anderson
et al., 2003; Phelps et al., 2006). The experimental paradigms used
to demonstrate this prioritization include detection, search, inter-
ference, masking, and the attentional blink. Many studies have
interpreted the interference produced by emotional distracters as
evidence that their processing is not only prioritized, but that
it occurs in an obligatory fashion that is independent of atten-
tion (Ohman et al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2001). Consistent
with this view, neuroimaging studies have reported that amygdala
responsivity to emotional stimuli is not modulated by attentional
manipulations, supporting the idea that emotional stimuli are
processed “automatically” (Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Dolan and
Vuilleumier, 2003).
However, it is also known that visual processing capacity
is limited. According to Lavie’s theory (Lavie, 2005), the per-
ceptual load of relevant information determines the selective
processing of irrelevant information. For instance, a high per-
ceptual load situation that engages full capacity levels to process
task-relevant stimuli would leave no spare capacity to perceive
task-irrelevant stimuli. However, in a low perceptual load sit-
uation, any capacity not taken up by the perception of task-
relevant stimuli would involuntarily “spill over” to the perception
of task-irrelevant distracters. This hypothesis has been investi-
gated by the manipulation of the attentional load of the main
task, sparing different levels of brain resources to process an
emotional distracter. According to the automaticity premise, if
emotional stimuli are processed automatically, then this process-
ing should occur even when brain resources are fully consumed
by the main task. However, a number of neuroimaging and
behavioral studies support an alternative hypothesis that emo-
tional stimuli compete for neural representation, thus requiring
attentional resources. These studies employed highly demand-
ing tasks while presenting emotional distracters and did not
show any evidence of the differential processing of emotional
stimuli, suggesting that the perception of emotional stimuli is
dependent on attention (Pessoa et al., 2002a,b, 2005; Mitchell
et al., 2007; Pourtois et al., 2010). These results have empha-
sized a reliance on attentional resources in processing emotional
stimuli. This “attentional load concept” appears to be a rea-
sonable explanation for the discrepancies that exist between
studies that suggest the automaticity of emotional stimuli pro-
cessing (Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Anderson et al., 2003) and
those that support attentional dependence for emotional pro-
cessing (Pessoa et al., 2002a,b; Silvert et al., 2007). However,
the attentional load concept does not fully explain the diver-
gent results reported in the literature (Muller et al., 2008;
Fenker et al., 2010) and it may be more flexible than initially
thought. Then, the way in which the processing of emotional
stimuli depends on attention remains unclear. In this brief
review, we present factors other than the perceptual load of
task-relevant processing that might be responsible for a greater
or lesser degree of the processing of task-irrelevant emotional
stimuli.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 364 | 1
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
Oliveira et al. Emotion and attention interaction
FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE AVAILABILITY (AND
ALLOCATION) OF PROCESSING RESOURCES TO
EMOTIONAL STIMULI
The first step in understanding the factors that define the extent to
which emotional stimuli are processed when they are presented as
distracters involves the participants ability to concentrate on the
relevant task and ignore the emotional stimuli. In this situation,
two factors are fundamental in determining the amount of pro-
cessing resources that are allocated to emotional stimuli: (1) the
relevance of the to-be ignored stimuli (the distracter) and (2) the
engagement in the main task due to motivation. Possibly, there
is a trade-off between these two factors, and the combination of
these factors determines the availability of processing resources
to emotional stimuli. Here, we propose that emotional distracter
processing is dependent on the main task load (Pessoa et al.,
2002a,b; Erthal et al., 2005), but that this association might be
modulated by the relevance of the distracter and the engagement
in the main task due to motivation. Specifically, we propose that
an enhanced relevance of the distracter might facilitate its pro-
cessing and an increase in the load of the relevant task would be
necessary to eliminate the processing of the distracter. However,
an increase in the engagement in the main task due to motivation
would diminish (and potentially eliminate) the processing of the
distracter, even if the distracter is an emotional stimulus. We also
suggest that differences between individuals may modulate the
trade-off between the relevance of the distracters and the engage-
ment to perform the main task due to motivation (see Figure 1).
In the next sections, we will discuss these factors in greater detail.
RELEVANCE OF THE TO-BE IGNORED STIMULI
The relevance of the to-be ignored stimuli may be a decisive fac-
tor in whether they will be processed in a privileged way by the
brain. Stimulus appraisal determines the extent to which stimuli
will be considered relevant to the individual’s goals or well-being,
which in turn dictates subsequent attention allocation (Sander
et al., 2005). Recently, Purkis et al. (2011) reported that strong
interference was produced in a visual search task involving pic-
tures related to the television program “Dr Who” performed by
fans of this program (Purkis et al., 2011). Moreover, in the same
task, interference generated by pictures of spiders was strongly
correlated with scores on a spider fear questionnaire, whereas
interference generated by pictures related to Dr Who was cor-
related with scores on a Dr Who expertise questionnaire. This
result suggested that the magnitude of the attentional bias for
positive and negative emotional stimuli was dependent on the rel-
evance of these stimuli for each individual. Consistent with this
finding, a person’s own name has been shown to modulate the
attentional blink (Shapiro et al., 1997) and can be detected sub-
stantially faster than control names in a visual search task (Mack
and Rock, 1998). In previous studies, emotional stimuli acquired
relevance via learning mechanisms, but their importance might
also be biologically determined. Brosch et al. (2008) examined
the Event-Related Potential (ERP) latency of participants who
performed a dot-probe detection task when biologically relevant
stimuli (pictures of angry faces or babies) served as cues (Brosch
et al., 2008). This study found that both emotional stimuli were
able to capture attention within a similar time course, result-
ing in the conclusion that biologically relevant stimuli, whether
fear- or nurture-relevant, have access to preferential processing
(see also Brosch et al., 2007). Furthermore, recent studies using
highly relevant emotional stimuli in phobic participants sug-
gested that the relevance of the stimuli determined their ability
to obtain brain resources even when these brain resources were
very limited. For instance, fear-related stimuli interfered with the
FIGURE 1 | Graphic representation of the theoretical proposal. The
gray line represents the relationship between the load of the main task,
the allocation of resources for the processing of the emotional distracters
and the allocation of resources for the processing of the main task. The
resources available for processing of the distracters is expected to
diminish (or even be abolished) as the load of the main task increases.
The blue line represents the modulation caused by the increase in the
engagement in the task due to motivation and the orange line represents
the modulation by the increase in the relevance of the to-be ignored
stimuli. Both the engagement in the main task due to motivation and the
relevance of the to-be ignored stimuli may vary from individual to
individual.
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performance of participants who were highly fearful of snakes or
spiders, even when their attention was directed elsewhere or when
attentional resources were limited (Okon-Singer et al., 2011). In
addition (Norberg et al., 2010) showed that spider-fearful partici-
pants demonstrated greater late-positive potentials (LPPs) toward
spiders than toward mushrooms even while performing a highly
demanding discrimination task (Norberg et al., 2010).
Taken together, these findings suggested that the relevance
of a stimulus determines its subsequent attention allocation.
Interestingly, these findings also suggested that stimulus relevance
may be enhanced if the stimulus is personally meaningful. Thus,
stimuli processing is prioritized and might recruit additional
resources even in situations where visual information attentional
resources are very limited.
ENGAGEMENT IN THE MAIN TASK—THE EFFECTS OF
MOTIVATION
As previously discussed, the relevance of the to-be ignored stimuli
may be a key factor to determine the processing of these stimuli.
On the other hand, the engagement in the main taskmay counter-
act the disruptive effect of the distractor, particularly in situations
in which the main task is very demanding (Lavie and de Fockert,
2003; Lavie, 2005). However, the demand of the main task itself is
not sufficient to determine the brain resources allocation to target
and prevent the distractor processing (see Lavie and de Fockert,
2003). In this review, we will discuss the hypothesis that another
key factor is the motivation of the participants in performing
the main task. We hypothesize that the increase in this motiva-
tion produces an increase in the allocation of resources, which in
turn, enhances the efficiency of performing the main task, result-
ing in diminished processing of the distracter (Figure 1). In other
words, engagement in the main task due to motivation might
allow the participants to upregulate top–down control processes
that bias the selection of the task information, thereby leading
to more efficient task processing and reducing the processing of
the distracter. Recent studies have shown that motivation pro-
duces an enhancement in executive function (Small et al., 2003,
2005; Engelmann and Pessoa, 2007; Mohanty et al., 2008; Della
and Chelazzi, 2009; Engelmann et al., 2009; Padmala and Pessoa,
2011). Motivation can enhance detection sensitivity during a
challenging attention task, and visual sensitivity is increased as
a function of absolute monetary incentive value (Engelmann and
Pessoa, 2007). Furthermore, Della and Chelazzi (2009) showed
that participants became more efficient at selecting targets that
were consistently associated with high-magnitude rewards (Della
and Chelazzi, 2009).
More importantly, Padmala and Pessoa (2011) showed that
motivation enhances the efficiency of performing a main task
and simultaneously ignoring the distracters in a conflict task
(Padmala and Pessoa, 2011). Specifically, the participants per-
formed a response conflict task (a picture of a house or building
was presented with an irrelevant congruent/neutral/incongruent
word) under two motivational contexts: (1) during the reward
condition - a cue stimulus of “$20” signaled that the partici-
pants would be rewarded for fast and correct performance and
(2) during the no reward condition - a cue stimulus of “$00” sig-
naled that no reward was involved. Behavioral results also showed
that the reward decreased both the interference (incongruent vs.
neutral) and facilitation effects (congruent vs. neutral), which
was consistent with the notion that motivation for the main task
enhanced attentional filtering, thereby reducing the influence of
the task-irrelevant word item. Furthermore, right intraparietal
sulcus activation was observed in conjunction with decreased
word-related responses in the left fusiform gyrus in the reward
condition compared with that observed in the no-reward condi-
tion. This is consistent with the idea that enhanced attentional
control elicited by a reward biased the processing in a way that
decreased the influence of irrelevant word stimuli.
Taken together, the results of these studies are consistent with
a model in which motivation applied to the main task functions
to upregulate top–down control processes leading to more effi-
cient task-requirements, thereby helping to diminish distracter
processing. In other words, engagement in the main task due
to motivation induces specific effects in the attentional network
that are related to increased efficiency in the ability to ignore dis-
tracters, even when participants perform a relatively low-load task
(see Figure 1).
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES: THE EFFECTS OF
PERSONALITY TRAITS
In this section, we add another element that reveals that the rela-
tionship between emotion and attention is flexible rather than
rigid. We will argue that differences between individuals mod-
ulate the availability (and allocation) of processing resources to
emotional stimuli as a function of personality traits. Both (a) the
relevance of the to-be ignored stimuli and (b) engagement to per-
form the main task due to motivation could vary from individual
to individual.
Regarding the relevance of the to-be ignored stimuli, mount-
ing evidence suggests that individual differences are important
predictors of sensitivity to emotional stimuli and help to explain
the variable effects of emotional stimuli. For example, studies
within the literature on anxiety have revealed that anxious par-
ticipants exhibit greater interference from threat-related stimuli.
MacLeod et al. (1986) showed that highly anxious participants are
faster to detect neutral targets that are presented spatially close
to threat words. It has also been shown that they have larger late
positive potentials (LPP)—an index of emotional processing—to
distractive unpleasant pictures compared to low anxiety subjects
(Mocaiber et al., 2009). Pérez-Dueñas et al. (2009) showed that
individuals with high trait anxiety did not present the expected
inhibition of return effect when threatening stimuli was the target
in a standard spatial cueing procedure. This result supports the
hypothesis of increased attentional capture by negative stimuli, in
high trait anxiety individuals. More recent studies have also inves-
tigated the extent to which amygdala responses to threat-related
distracters depend upon individual anxiety levels (Bishop et al.,
2004). Whereas low-anxiety individuals only showed increased
amygdala responses to attended fearful faces, highly anxious indi-
viduals showed increased amygdala responses to both attended
and unattended threat-related stimuli. These findings suggest that
the threat value of a stimulus varies as a function of a partici-
pant’s anxiety level, and consequently, affect how meaningfully
this stimulus is considered. However, other studies have suggested
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that attention is important even for highly anxious individu-
als (Fox et al., 2005; Bishop et al., 2007). For example, Bishop
et al. (2007) found a positive correlation between the anxiety
state and amygdala reactivity to threat-related distracters under
low, but not high, attentional load. In other words, even when a
stimulus was personally relevant, its processing was not immune
to attention availability. Thus, these studies suggest that specific
individual sensitivity to a stimulus might define the distribution
of brain resources.
Studies exploring affective style also provides evidences that
individual differences are important predictors of sensitivity to
emotional stimuli. For instance, high neuroticism predicts greater
amygdala activation to a task involving emotional processing
(Haas et al., 2007). Oliveira et al. (2009) demonstrated that high
positive affect trait individuals showed attenuated autonomic
reactions to the mutilation pictures. Furthermore, Souza et al.
(2007) showed that individual predispositions, e.g. negative affec-
tive trait and vagal tone, influence heart period recovery after a
speech stress task.
Individual differences appear to be important not only regard-
ing the relevance of the to be ignored stimuli but also regarding
the engagement in the main task due to motivation. Personality
traits can influence how the participants react to incentives during
a relevant task (Locke and Braver, 2008; Engelmann et al., 2009;
Savine et al., 2010). For instance, Locke and Braver (2008) showed
that motivational incentives were associated with improved per-
formance and greater cognitive control and that the relation-
ship between reward and brain activity may be modulated by
how participants perceive a reward (Locke and Braver, 2008).
Moreover, Padmala and Pessoa (2011) found that the functional
connectivity between the right intraparietal sulcus and the right
nucleus accumbens is also correlated with the behavioral activa-
tion system (BAS) scores, which suggests that reward sensitivity
influences how the regions interact with each other during the
performance of a highly motivating task (Padmala and Pessoa,
2011).
In summary, the trade-off between engagement in the main
task and the relevance of the to-be ignored stimuli appears to be
modulated by differences between individuals. As illustrated in
Figure 1, we suggest that the amount of shifting produced by the
relevance of a distracter and the engagement in the main task due
to motivation is dependent on individual differences.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Currently, the literature presents two opposing views on how
emotion and attention interact: the classical view, which states
that emotional stimuli are processed in an automatic fashion due
to its relevance for survival (Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Anderson
et al., 2003) and a competing view, which states that even
emotional stimuli or events are regulated by top-down influ-
ences and are not immune to attention availability (Pessoa et al.,
2002a,b, 2005; Erthal et al., 2005). However, it appears that these
mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, as was initially proposed.
Here, we discussed how emotion and selective attention inter-
act with each other. Despite Lavie’s theory, which postulates
that the perceptual load of relevant information determines the
selective processing of irrelevant information, debate is ongo-
ing regarding the dependency of attention to emotional pro-
cessing. Although we are in agreement with Lavie’s theory, we
suggest other important key issues in determining the associa-
tion between the load of the main task and distracter processing:
(1) the relevance of the to-be ignored stimuli and (2) engage-
ment in the main task due to motivation. We postulate that
these factors function as opposing forces to influence distracter
processing. Specifically, the relevance of the distracter facilitates
its brain processing and increases the effect of these stimuli on
behavior. In contrast, increased motivation to perform the main
task increases the engagement of the participant and reduces the
resources needed to process the affective distracter. Furthermore,
it is important to note that both the relevance of the stimu-
lus and the engagement in the main task due to motivation are
modulated by individual differences. We propose that there is a
trade-off between these two aspects and that the combination
of these factors could generate different outputs. For example,
the relevance of the stimuli does not ensure that these stimuli
will be necessarily processed. As previously stated, the partici-
pant’s own names appear to have facilitated brain processing,
although evidence also suggests that this facilitation is subject
to capacity limitations (Harris et al., 2004). Thus, the trade-off
between these factors will help to determine whether the emo-
tional distracter can be processed in a privileged way. In summary,
we suggest that emotional distracter processing is dependent
on a balance between the relevance of the distracter and the
engagement in the main task due to motivation. As illustrated
in Figure 1, we also suggest that this trade-off is modulated by
individual differences. Thus, the relationship between emotion
and attention is flexible rather than rigid and is dependent on
several aspects. Therefore, considering this perspective may help
in understanding the divergence described by several studies in
this field.
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